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Over the last fifteen years, prosecutors in at least thirty-four states
used child abuse or drug-related statutes to punish pregnant women
who use illegal drugs, charging these women with a range of offenses,
including child abuse, child neglect, child endangerment, and delivery
of drugs to a minor.' Although there are no criminal statutes specifi-
cally targeting substance abuse during pregnancy, states successfully
2prosecuted over 200 pregnant women using these strategies. Some
women received jail sentences, while others were institutionalized
against their will, and still others lost custody of their child after
birth.3
Opponents of such punitive measures push for a public-health ori-
ented response to drug use by pregnant women instead, arguing that a
punitive approach is flawed because of its negative impact on the doc-
tor-patient relationship; 4 its discriminatory effects on African Ameri-
J.D. 2007, UCLA School of Law; B.A. 2000, Yale University.
See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (reversing convic-
tion of a pregnant woman for delivering drugs to a minor through the umbilical cord);
State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 710 (Ohio 1992) (affirming order denying prosecution
of a woman for child endangerment after she took cocaine while pregnant); Whitner
v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-79 (S.C. 1997) (finding that a fetus was a person under
the South Carolina child neglect statute and, thus, finding the pregnant woman who
took crack cocaine in her third tri-mester guilty of criminal child neglect); People v.
Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the circuit court had
found that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove "that defendant's inges-
tion of cocaine, while pregnant, caused serious physical harm to her child," and there-
fore did not constitute second-degree child abuse). Drinking alcohol during preg-
nancy might lead to similar charges, however, drinking presents different issues and is
beyond the scope of this article.
2 Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to
Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REv. 999, 1002 (1999).
3 Jean Reith Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health
Oriented Responses to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETmIcs 217, 221 (2001).
4 Cheryl M. Plambeck, Divided Loyalties: Legal and Bioethical Considera-
tions of Physician-Pregnant Patient Confidentiality and Prenatal Drug Abuse, 23 J.
LEGAL MED. 34 (2002) (arguing that the protection of the fetus by the physician under
the two-patient model disrespects the mother patient and will likely discourage her
from seeking medical help).
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can women;5 and its failure to treat drug addiction as an illness.6
Since prosecutions of drug-using women tends to deter those women
from seeking health care during their pregnancies, thus harming both
mother and fetus, a number of prominent groups, among them the
American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics,
the American Public Health Association, the American Nurses Asso-
ciation, the American Society on Addiction Medicine and the March
of Dimes, oppose this type of criminal prosecution.7 Moreover, most
appellate courts that have addressed the issue rejected the theory that
maternal substance abuse constitutes child abuse, finding either that
the statutes do not apply on technical grounds or that criminalization
would promote bad public policy and could lead to the criminalization
of other legal activities, as well as violate a woman's due process
rights.8
Despite these precedents, prosecutors continue to utilize child
abuse and neglect laws against pregnant women who use drugs, argu-
ing that criminal interventions are necessary in order to protect fetal
and newborn lives,9 to "encourage" pregnant women to seek treat-
5 Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1991)
(arguing that punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their fetuses to term helps to
perpetuate a racist hierarchy in our society).
6 See, e.g., Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing that
drug addiction is an illness which requires medical treatment); Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that it is unconstitutional to make drug
addiction a crime because it is an illness, and criminalizing it is cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments).
7 LYNN M. PALTROW, DAVID S. COHEN, & CORINNE A. CAREY, YEAR 2000
OVERVIEW: GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO PREGNANT WOMEN WHO USE ALCOHOL
OR OTHER DRUGS 1 (2000),
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.orglfile/gov-response-review.pdf.
8 State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that criminalizing pregnant drug addicts conflicted with the public policy
underlying Florida's child welfare law of preserving the family life of parents and
children); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) (finding that
the criminal abuse statute in question did not intend to criminalize pregnant women
using controlled substances); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1992) (dismissing the charges against the pregnant woman for child endangerment
on the grounds that a fetus is not a person and finding that criminalization maternal
substance abuse would violate a pregnant woman's due process rights because she
would not be on notice that the statute can be applied to criminalize her substance
abuse during pregnancy); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (noting that
criminalizing substance abuse during pregnancy would open the door to punishing for
the use of alcohol, nicotine, or over-the-counter drugs).
9 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized that the state has an "im-
portant and legitimate," even "compelling," interest in the life of the fetus after viabil-
ity. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); see also John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the
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ment, and to change their behavior.'0 The continued prosecution of
pregnant women is a modem form of eugenicism in that it amounts to
a policy of reducing the spread of "bad" traits by preventing a certain
class of women from reproducing. Accordingly, such prosecutions
must stop, and more resources should be devoted to health initiatives
targeted at helping these women overcome their drug addiction.
According to Sir Francis Galton, the founder of the eugenics
movement, "[e] ugenics is the science which deals with all influences
that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that de-
velop them to the utmost advantage."" Influenced in large part by
Mendelian genetics, eugenicism promoted the theory that society
could be improved by creating superior classes of specimens through
a process of selection, and elimination of certain traits. 12 Essentially,
eugenicists believed that encouraging those with desirable traits to
marry and reproduce, while preventing carriers tainted with undesir-
able traits from procreating could result in a reduction of socially
problematic behaviors. Thus, eugenics offered the appealing vision of
a world where social problems could be eliminated by purging those
with "bad seeds" from the gene pool.
In the United States, at least 30 states embraced this theory, and
started their own eugenics programs, sterilizing roughly 70,000
Americans pursuant to state order.' 3 These programs targeted a vari-
ety of groups, sterilizing people for such reasons as mental illness,
imbecility, promiscuity, criminality, and even laziness.' 4  Although
the last of these programs ended in the 1970s and states have begun to
make reparations to those individuals subject to these inhumane or-
Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 438 (1983)
(arguing that "once the mother decides not to terminate the pregnancy, the viable
fetus acquires rights to have the mother conduct her life in ways that will not injure
it"); Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitu-
tional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 599, 612
(1986) (arguing that the recognition of the fetus as a person who had protectable
constitutional rights apart from the woman could be used against the pregnant
woman).
1o See Rachel Roth, Note, The Perils of Pregnancy: Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 149, 151 (2002).
1 Francis Galton, Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims, 10 AM. J. Soc.,
1, 1 (1904).
12 See id. at 1-3.






ders,' 5 eugenics programs are still constitutional under Buck v. Bell,16
a 1927 Supreme Court decision, which remains good law.
In the 1980s, the media focused national attention on the "crack
epidemic," documenting the destructive effects of cocaine abuse
among young pregnant women, and predicting a lost generation irre-
deemably damaged as a result of their mothers' cocaine use. 17 Maga-
zines, newspapers, and television news reports portrayed pregnant
drug-addicted women as "non-mothers," women who were com-
pletely under the spell of their addiction, who, as a result of their drug
use, had increased sex drives, and who turned to prostitution to feed
their habits.' 8 In addition, the media perpetuated the image that crack
addiction damaged women's "maternal instincts," that it left users in
despair, and stripped them of "every shred of human dignity." 9 The
sensationalist coverage fueled the belief that pregnant, drug-addicted
women were unfit to be mothers, and prompted prosecutors across the
nation to crack down on the problem, prosecuting women for a range
of offenses under the child abuse, neglect, and drug distribution stat-
utes.
Over time, however, the media's portrayal of drug-addicted
women as "bad mothers" has proven largely a myth. In fact, contrary
to their depiction in the media, most of these women are desperate to
kick their habits, and like other "good" mothers, want to provide the
best they can for their babies. 20 One study focusing solely on cocaine-
using mothers found that these mothers look after, and care ade-
quately for their children.2' Specifically, the study found these
women valued motherhood highly, and held firm standards for child-
rearing.22 Another more recent study reported similar findings, con-
15 id.
16 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
17 For example, one article in The New York Times stated that pregnant
women were "producing a new generation of innocent addicts," erroneously implying
that babies exposed prenatally to crack are all born hooked on the drug. Jane E.
Brody, Widespread Abuse of Drugs by Pregnant Women is Found, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1988, at A1; see PALTROW, COHEN & CAREY, supra note 7, at 1.
18 DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION,
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 156 (1997) (describing the media's caricature of the
pregnant addict as "an irresponsible and selfish woman who put her love for crack
above her love for her children ... who sometimes traded sex for crack, in violation
of every conceivable quality of a good mother").
'9 Id. at 155.
20 Id. at 156.
21 Magaret H. Kearney et al., Mothering on Crack Cocaine: A Grounded




cluding there was no significant difference in childrearing practices
between addicted, and non-addicted mothers.23
Unfortunately, even though both the media and scientific commu-
nity have since acknowledged that there is no clear correlation be-
tween drug abuse during pregnancy and parenting abilities, prosecu-
tions against these women have not abated. According to a 2000 sur-
vey of the civil and criminal laws directly addressing pregnant
women's use of alcohol and other drugs, recent legislation continues
in the vein of punitive and restrictive responses. 24 In addition, the
Supreme Court has not definitely held that prosecutions such as these
are unconstitutional. Although the Court, in 2001, held that involun-
tary drug testing of pregnant women was a constitutional violation,
they did so on Fourth Amendment grounds, finding such testing an
unreasonable search and seizure. 25 In Ferguson, the Court avoided
addressing the question of whether a fetus fits the legal definition of a
person.26 Thus, the Court left open the possibility that prosecutors
could continue to take legal action against women for delivering drugs
to their fetuses.27
Prosecutors argue that a punitive approach is the most efficacious
28means of pushing these women to seek treatment for their addiction.
However, punitive approaches have failed to reduce both the inci-
dence and the harmful effects of drug use during pregnancy.29 With
no definitive evidence showing that prosecutions have improved the
problem of drug addiction during pregnancy, these strategies no
longer serving the original purpose, and instead have become a means
for furthering other ends. In particular, some states use these prosecu-
tions to control the reproductive choices of a class of women deemed
23 SUSAN C. BOYD, MOTHERS AND ILLIcIT DRUGS: TRANSCENDING THE MYTHS
14-16 (1999) (listing at least fourteen studies demonstrating that women who use
illicit drUs can be adequate parents).
PALTROW, COHEN & CAREY, supra note 7, at 9.
25 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
26 d.
27 Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 3, at 227.
28 Roth, supra note 10, at 151.
29 See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births
without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 569, 601-02 (1992) (citing
evidence and opinion that penalties directed at women who use illegal drugs during
pregnancy are counterproductive to the government's objective of promoting healthy
births and therefore do not serve a compelling interest); Katherine Sikich, Peeling
Back the Layers of Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 369, 391-96 (2005) (arguing that the failure of punitive measures to successfully
reduce drug use in pregnant women is due to the fact that the woman's voice is ig-
nored in a paternalistic model which prioritizes the fetus over the mother and due to
the fact that society is not really willing to help these women).
2008]
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socially undesirable. In this way, such prosecutions are a pretext for
eugenicism.
The criminalization of drug-addicted pregnant women under the
child-abuse and neglect statutes is premised on the notion that the
woman is harming the fetus by taking drugs. The justification for
punishment is as follows: because they harm their fetuses, these
women are bad mothers, thus they deserve to be punished. This laud-
able rationale, however, masks eugenicist beliefs regarding the social
value of certain traits in women and children. With the continued
prosecution of drug using pregnant women, the prosecutions them-
selves have become a legitimating force, validating eugenicist beliefs,
and furthering the notion that these women should not be having chil-
dren.
First, categorizing drug use while pregnant as a deliberate act of
child abuse legitimates the idea that these women are categorically
"bad" mothers. By classifying substance abuse as a "bad" trait, the
addiction becomes a lapse in judgment and self-control, not a chronic
disease. Thus, because drug use is supposedly within the individ-
ual's power, substance abuse is a reflection of the individual's lack of
morality, responsibility, and ability as a parent. This feeds the belief
that addicts are unfit mothers, and should not be getting pregnant in
the first place. According to Lynn Paltrow, "[o] n call-in radio talk
shows someone inevitably asks why these mothers can't just be steril-
ized or injected with Depo-Provera until they can overcome their drug
problems and, while they are at it, their low socio economic status.
30
The idea that addicts should not be having children because they are
"unfit" mothers is a eugenicist over-generalization because it is based
on the grossly mistaken presumption that substance abuse is a "bad"
trait. Not only does it overlook studies which have proven the con-
trary, but it seeks to prevent those with "bad" traits from procreating.
Another effect of categorizing drug addicts "unfit" mothers is that
it perpetuates the belief that "bad" traits will be passed on through bad
parenting. The rationale is that women who are "unfit" mothers will
fail at child-rearing. Implicit in this thinking is the assumption that
the children of these women will invariably become problems for so-
ciety because they have not been exposed to good parenting. Thus,
society would be better off if someone else raised these children. At-
tempts by the state to prevent further reproduction by such "unfit"
30 Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishment and Prejudice: Judging Drug-Using Preg-
nant Women, in MOTHER TROUBLES: RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL




mothers is also eugenicist because it embraces the belief that social
problems can be precluded by preventing the spread of socially unfa-
vorable traits from one generation to the next.
In addition, criminal prosecution of pregnant drug addicts for fetal
abuse, or other similar crimes is eugenicist because it reinforces the
classification of certain babies as more desirable than others on the
basis of traits society supposedly deems valuable. Prosecutors justify
punishment of these women for child abuse on the assumption that
they are inflicting some harm on the fetus. However, research has
shown that cocaine - the drug most often at the center of these prose-
cutions- is not uniquely, or even inevitably harmful to fetal develop-
ment.3' Continued prosecutions, in spite of these findings, perpetuates
the myth that cocaine causes permanent physical and mental damage
to the child. Justifying prosecutions on the basis of potential physical
and mental damage to fetal development legitimates the belief that
babies born from women who use drugs necessarily have defects, and
that babies without defect are more "valuable." This inferential chain
is, ultimately eugenicist because it makes a subjective determination
as to what traits are "good" and "bad," and thereby reinforces the so-
cietal perception of those traits.
Over time, continued prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant
women for child abuse legitimates these eugenicist beliefs and has
become one means of furthering policies pressuring these women to
get abortions, long-term birth control, or sterilizations. Thus, the
prosecutions have effectively become a modern eugenics program.
Although prosecutors argue that prosecutions are meant to incentivize
women to seek treatment, and not to pressure them to seek abortions
3 1 Research has yet to determine that drug exposure will always harm the
fetus. Epidemiological studies find that, statistically speaking, many more children
are at risk of harm from prenatal exposure to cigarettes and alcohol than cocaine.
Barry Zuckerman et al., Effect of Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal
Growth, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED., 762 (1990); Deborah A. Frank and Barry S. Zucker-
man, Children Exposed to Cocaine Prenatally: Pieces of the Puzzle, 15
NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY 298, 298 (1993); Deborah A. Frank, Karen
Bresnahan & Barry S. Zuckerman, Maternal Cocaine Use: Impact on Child Health
and Development, 40 ADVANCES IN PEDIATRICS 65-99 (1993). Unlike fetal alcohol
syndrome, which causes permanent mental retardation, cocaine seems to act more like
cigarettes and marijuana, increasing certain risks like low birth weight, but only as
one contributing factor and only in some pregnancies. CENTER ON ADDICTION AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND THE AMERICAN
WOMAN (1996); Joseph R. DiFranza & Robert A. Lew, Effect of Maternal Cigarette




or other forms of birth control, the unavailability of drug treatment
programs for these women belies their argument.
In 1992, Wendy Chavkin conducted a national survey of state di-
rectors of substance abuse services to assess nationwide policies and
practices regarding the issues of criminal prosecutions, charges of
child abuse, and treatment options for pregnant drug-using women.33
The results revealed a gap between criminalization and treatment ef-
forts, as well as a lack of coordination with other public health initia-
tives directed at reproductive and infant health.34 Although there was
marked improvement in the availability of drug treatment programs
for pregnant women between 1989 and 1993, researchers found that
pregnant women still faced other institutional barriers to accessing
drug treatment programs.3 5  By 1995, the situation had actually wors-
ened. According to a follow-up study conducted by Chavkin and her
team, by 1995, more states were prosecuting pregnant women for sub-
stance abuse than before, and more states had implemented mandatory
reporting of positive toxicology results of newborns to the criminal
justice system, child protective services, or the Department of
Health.36 Unfortunately, the increase in state intervention was not met
with a similar increase in resources to provide adequate treatment for
32 Roth, supra note 10, at 151.
33 Wendy Chavkin, Vicki Breitbart, and Paul Wise, Efforts to Reduce Perina-
tal Mortality, HIV, and Drug Addiction: Surveys of the States, 50 J. AM. MED.
WOMEN'S Assoc. 164, 164 (1995).
34 Id. at 164-65. Chavkin found that 45% of the maternal child health centers
interviewed had reported that criminal prosecution of drug-using pregnant women had
transpired in their state. Only 7 of the states at the time had legislation specifying that
drug treatment or prevention services be provided to women. Id. at 164. In addition,
only 41% reported that their states' initiatives to reduce infant mortality had formal
links to substance abuse treatment, and only 43% of the states that involved the child
protection services when pregnant women or newborns showed evidence of illicit
drug involvement had formal links between the infant mortality reduction programs
and substance abuse treatment programs. Id. at 165.
35 Vicki Breitbart et al., The Accessibility of Drug Treatment for Pregnant
Women: A Survey of Programs in Five Cities, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1658, 1661
(1994). Through simulated calls to 294 drug treatment programs in five cities, this
study investigated access for pregnant women and compared New York City's provi-
sion of services in 1989 to that in 1993. In all sites, the majority of programs accepted
pregnant women. In addition, there was a marked improvement in the availability of
services in New York City. However, options were more limited for Medicaid recipi-
ents and women needing child care, and an appointment or referral for prenatal care
was usually not offered. Id.at 1658-1661.
36 Wendy Chavkin, Vicky Breitbart, Deborah Elman, & Paul H. Wise, Na-
tional Survey of the States: Policies and Practices Regarding Drug-Using Pregnant
Women, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 117,117-18 (1998).
[Vol. 18:127
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these women. In fact, in the national drive to adopt Medicaid man-
aged care, the trend has been in the direction of reduced services, with
competition between needy groups for diminished resources.37
These studies suggest that women have few viable options when
confronted with a potential criminal prosecution. They can either face
the severe penalties which come with criminalization or can avoid
having their drug use detected by not seeking medical care during the
course of their pregnancy or by choosing to get an abortion. For
women who are not already pregnant, but are suffering from drug
addiction, the fear of criminal prosecution may drive many of them to
seek long-term methods of birth control or, even sterilization. Thus,
criminal prosecutions have the perverse effect of controlling these
women's reproductive choices, and can ultimately prevent a whole
group of women from reproducing.
Upon closer examination of the profiles of the women being
prosecuted, the effects of these criminal prosecutions tell a sobering
story. The women prosecuted are almost always Black and poor.
And because every one of them abuses illegal drugs, every one of
them is a "criminal." Hence, the prosecutions basically prevent poor,
Black criminals from reproducing. Historically, society classifies all
three traits historically as "bad," and all three were once targets of the
eugenics movement. It is not mere happenstance that the prosecutions
against this particular class of pregnant women bear the hallmarks of
eugenicism. Rather, when a policy methodically attempts to root out
a class of people with "bad" traits by preventing them from procreat-
ing, it is eugenicism.
The eugenics movement of the early twentieth century provides "a
graphic example of how a blinkered belief, even when peppered with
good intentions, can go woefully wrong, [and when] predicated on
evil intentions ... takes us down the road to genocide. 38 Nonetheless,
even though eugenics has long been discredited as a recognized sci-
ence, and today is widely considered "politically incorrect," eugenicist
thinking continues to pervade societal values. One of the most influ-
ential legacies left behind by the eugenics movement is the way it
influenced social values and how, as a society, we define what is
"good" or "bad." These value judgments can, and do silently perme-
ate social policy, with devastating effects. In many ways, this invisi-
37 Chavkin, supra note 36, at 119. My research did not turn up any more
recent surveys on this and there is no research which shows that this trend has re-
versed significantly in the last 10 years.3 Elaine E. Sutherland, Procreative Freedom and Convicted Criminals in
the United States and the United Kingdom: Is Child Welfare Becoming the New
Eugenics? 82 OR. L. REv. 1033, 1063 (2003).
20081
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ble manifestation of eugenicism is even more insidious than eugenics
movements of the past because it lulls us into believing that it is not
there.
The prosecution of pregnant women who use drugs for crimes of
child abuse is an example of how prosecutions can become a legiti-
mating force, validating eugenicist beliefs, which can result in pres-
suring an entire class of women to terminate their pregnancies. Be-
cause these prosecutions are not as blatantly inhumane as Nazism, or a
policy which mandates the sterilization of imbeciles, they are less
likely to offend the public's conscience, as would an otherwise pat-
ently obvious eugenicist policy. Moreover, because the women being
prosecuted are drug users, and, therefore, criminals, they engender
less sympathy. Irregardless, neither are valid justifications for any
kind of eugenicist policy.
Eugenicism tends to attribute the cause of social problems to cer-
tain individuals, and assumes that these problems will go away if
these individuals are removed from the gene pool. This process is
exemplified in the way the state has dealt with the problem of addic-
tion among pregnant women by prosecuting them. Rather than ad-
dressing the true causes of drug addiction among pregnant women, the
state has used prosecutions as a method to rid society of a group per-
ceived as delinquents. Not only is this approach overly simplistic,
inaccurate, and morally suspect, but it provides the state a means to
escape its responsibility of having to figure out the true source of the
problems. Society must own up to being part of the problem, rather
than blame-shifting to one group of individuals. Thus, rather than
blaming these women for their addiction, the state should devote
greater resources to public health interventions more respectful of
women's rights, and tailored to meet the healthcare needs of these
mothers, and their fetuses. It is only in this way will we more effec-
tively combat the problem of drug addiction in pregnant women.
[Vol. 18:127
